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CONFLICT AND CONSENSUS 
AMONG ELITES IN THE FEDERAL 
REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 
Ursula Hoffmann-Lange, Helga Neumann, 
and Bärbel Steinkemper 
THE ROLE OF ELITES IN PLURALIST DEMOCRACIES 
In Western democracies the theory of plural ist democracy is widely used as a 
model of the process of opinion and policy formation. In its classic version, this 
theory was conceived as a participatory model whose central variables were 
multiple group memberships and the concept of cross-pressures. V. Pareto, G. 
Mosca, M. Ostrogorski, and R. Michels, however, earlier contended that the 
"masses" are unable to rule themselves and that the existence of elites or ruling 
classes is universal. Later, the results of empirical political research also called 
into question the validity of the assumptions of the classic theory of pluralistic 
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democracy with regard to the number and meaning of multiple group mem-
berships, the extent of active political participation, and the existence of a broad 
consensus on basic values and the "rules of the game" within the general 
population. 
In the "realistic" theory of democracy, therefore, instead of individuals and 
groups, it is the elites who are considered to be the main political actors in the 
processes of interest articulation and policy formation. Thus, modem pluralist 
theory and elite theory both agree "that leadership groups and their interre-
lationships are the theoretical key to the explanation of political behavior" (Bal-
bus, 1975:237). There is, however, no agreement between these two schools of 
thought concerning the nature and composition of elites or the limitations set on 
elite actions by the social structure. While power elite theorists assume a some-
what oversimplified relation between economic status and political power, the 
pluralists have neglected the impact of socioeconomic and institutional structures 
on the policy formation process. 
In the following, starting with abrief description of the structural features of 
the social and political system, I we will investigate the nature of elites in the 
Federal Republic of Germany, as weIl as the opportunities for cooperation and 
conflict among different elites. The first part will be devoted to the analysis of 
the social distances between elite groups, i.e., background and career differences 
which can create barriers to intersectoral communication and thus lead to diffi-
culties in reaching agreement on collective decisions within the elites. 
In the second part, investigating the political beliefs of elites, we want to show 
the main cleavage lines within the elites. In a pluralist society, such conflicts of 
interests or values must be considered as normal. Their rational settlement re-
quires, however, the acceptance of certain rules of the game by the conflicting 
parties. These rules normally include the acceptance of political institutions such 
as general elections, party competition, and the majority principle, i.e., the 
general willingness to cooperate and compromise with competing groups in a 
pluralist process of policy formation. Therefore, we shall also investigate 
whether such a consensus on the mIes of the game exists within the West German 
elite. 
Given the decline of traditional patterns of ruling class homogeneity based on 
social ties and homogeneous political outlooks, we assume that more fonnalized 
interactions such as multiple position holding and role-related contacts to a wide 
range of organizations prevail among modem elites. These will be analyzed in 
the last part of the paper. 
DEFINING LEADERSHIP GROUPS IN THE FEDERAL 
REPUBLIC 
We shall try to answer the questions raised above by analyzing the data of an elite 
survey carried out in 1972. 2 Like previous empirical studies on national elites in 
the Federal Republic this study proceeded from a positional approach defining 
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the elites as holders of top positions in the most important organizations of 
society, (Edinger, 1960; Deutsch and Edinger, 1959; Zapf, 1965; Wildenmann, 
1968; Enke, 1974; Roth, 1976). This implies the assumption that power is 
organized in tenns of division of labor. As a first step it requires the identifica-
tion of relevant organizations, an undertaking which is, however, not without 
problems. In doing this "one has to rely on what overall knowledge one has of 
the system under investigation. There is no question that an ample portion of 
arbitrary judgment is involved as long as sound theories of the system' s structure 
and behavior are lacking." (Schleth, 1971:103). Zapf, reviewing the different 
approaches to solving this problem in a theoretically and analytically coherent 
fashion, comes to the concIusion that they all have proved to be inadequate and 
that Iists of groups and positions' 'which have been drawn up by informed social 
scientists using their considered 'judgment' " have worked best (1965:68). 
For the purpose of the survey of 1972 three main sectors were identified: the 
private sector, the mass media, and the political-administrative sector. In the 
private sector, those subsectors and organizations were selected which have the 
greatest potential for the organization and assertion of special interests, i.e., 
business, business associations, and trade unions. The mass media were included 
because of the crucial role they play in the opinion-formation process. In West 
Gennany, the press and the broadcasting media as two distinctive subsectors are 
organized in two different ways: the press on a private enterprise basis and the 
broadcasting media on the basis of support from public bodies financed by 
govemment-regulated revenues, (i.e., fees paid by the consumers), and con-
trolled by boards composed of representatives of major organizations of the 
private sector such as political parties, churches, and other voluntary associa-
tions. The political sec tor was represented by position holders in the federal and 
state administrations ,3 legislatures, and political parties as weIl as the civil 
service and the military. After having identified all relevant position holders they 
were asked for an interview. The overall response rate was 60.2 percent. 
In the following, we give abrief description of the composition of the different 
elite groups ("sectors ") whieh were included in the analysis: 
• Federal government andfederal parliament (Bundestag) (n = lOO)-cabi-
net members and junior ministers within the federal govemment; chairmen 
and deputy chairmen of permanent committees, parliamentary party 
groups, and permanent working groups of the parliamentary parties within 
the Bundestag; spokesmen of the parliamentary party groups for the differ-
ent poliey areas 
• State governments (n = 82)-all cabinet members 
• Political parties (n = 68)-members of the national eommittees of the 
political parties represented in the Bundestag (CDU, SPD, FDP), as weIl as 
the ehainnen and deputy chairmen of these parties on the state level (in-
cluding the CSU) 
• F ederal political civil servants (n = 78)-administrative heads 
(Staatssekretäre) and department heads of federal ministries 
246 U. HOFFMANN-LANGE, H. NEUMANN, and B. STEINKEMPER 
• Permanent federal civil servants (n = 138)-subdepartment heads in 
federal ministries; heads of the most important federal agencies 
• State political civil servants (n = 53)-administrative heads of state 
ministries 
• Permanent state civil servants (n = 209)-department heads in state 
ministries 
• Mass media (n = 224)-managing directors, program directors, editors-
in-chief, and heads of politically relevant departments of the broadcasting 
stations (n = 94); the editors-in-chief and heads of political and economic 
desks of daily and weekly newspapers with a circulation of at least 100,000 
copies and those of leading magazines (n = 130) 
• Publishers (n = 38)-publishers and managing directors of the news-
papers and magazines in the above categories 
• Big business (n = 173)-leading members of the executive boards, 
chairmen and deputy chairmen of the boards of directors of the largest 
business corporations (industry, trade, service) 
• Banks and insurance companies (n = 74)-leading members ofthe execu-
tive boards, chairmen and deputy chairmen of the boards of directors of the 
largest financial corporations 
• Business associations (n = IOl)-chairmen or presidents and their depu-
ties as weIl as managing directors of the federal top associations of business 
• Small business associations (n = 20)-presidents and vice-presidents as 
weIl as managing directors of the federal associations of small business 
enterprises such as crafts and retail trade 
• Agricultural associations (n = 53)-presidents or chairman and their dep-
uties as weIl as managing directors of the agricultural associations at the 
federal and state level 
• Trade unions (n = 62)-chairmen and their deputies as weIl as managing 
directors of federallabor associations, Le., the leading position holders in 
the top association and the member unions of the DGß (German Trade 
Union Federation) and the DAG (German white-collar employees union) 
• Science and higher education (n = 46)-presidents of universities (Rek-
toren), as weIl as the chairmen and managing directors of the biggest 
research organizations and science foundations 
• Military (n = 41)-position holders in the highest echelons of the military 
hierarchy (generals and admirals) 
ELITE RECRUITMENT 
The differentiation of modem industrial societies and the resulting autonomy of 
different sectors make communication and cooperation between various group 
representatives more difficult. Formerly, social homogeneity made communica-
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tion and cooperation easier between segmented groups by means of a "common 
language" (Dahrendorf, 1965; Edinger and Searing, 1967). 
Sodal Profiles 
Since the beginning of this century the characteristics of the Gerrnan lead-
ership dass have changed noticeably (Zapf, 1965). This change was caused in 
part by the two world wars-especially by World War II-and their conse-
quences, such as the breakdown of the economy and a massive population 
displacement which blurred the traditional lines of social deavage (Lepsius, 
1974), quite apart from the elimination ofleadership personnel (i.e., the nobility 
and large landowners). A second important contributing factor was the develop-
ment of the Federal Republic of Germany into a modem industrial society with 
its changing requirements as to the number of leaders needed as weH as their 
specialized qualifications; today, criteria of achievement are stressed more than 
intimate ties. 
Despite the disintegration of the traditional dass structure, membership in a 
particular social stratum is still significant from the standpoint of either a com-
mon or dividing socialization. An analysis of the social status (or dass mem-
bership) of incumbents of top leaders hip positions documents a shift in the basis 
of recruitment from a pattern of predominantly upper-dass recruitment to a 
stronger representation of the middle dass (Lepsius, 1974:180): almost two-
thirds of the respondents came from a middle or lower-middle-dass background 
(Table I). 
Within the elite sectors certain concentrations can be seen. Thus, the scien-
tific-educational and military sectors as weH as the business associations are 
disproportionately recruited from the upper dass (between 40 and 49 percent). 
The portion coming from the lower dass is disproportionately high among trade 
union leaders (16.7 percent), as is to be expected, but also among Bundestag 
leaders, where a substantial proportion are of lower-dass origins. This is mainly 
due to the SPD members of Parliament: whereas the CDU/CSU and the FDP 
parliamentary parties are, in terms of dass origins, concentrated in the lower 
middle dass (50.0 and 55.6 percent, respectively) and draw hardly at aH from the 
lower dass, one-quarter of the SPD parliamentary leadership group are of lower-
dass origins and only about one-third (34.3 percent) come from the lower middle 
dass. Similar social background patterns were found among the state govem-
ment and the party elites. 
By and large, the social distances among the majority of the members of the 
elite have shrunk; this tendency is strengthened by the fact that most of the 
sectors are relatively heterogeneous in their recruitment pattern. Nevertheless, 
entry into leadership positions for persons of lower-dass origins is largely re-
stricted to trade unions and the SPD. 
To be sure, the family's social status determines to a large degree the kind and 
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Table 1. Social Class OriginG (percentages) 
Upper Upper Middle Lower Middle 
Class Class Class Lower Class 
Federal governmentlparliament 19.3b 25.0 44.3 11.4 
State govemments 26.1 21.7 42.0 10.1 
Political parties 23.7 22.0 45.8 8.5 
Political civil servants, federal level 29.9 38.8 28.4 3.0 
Pennanent civil servants, federallevel 36.0 32.4 29.7 1.8 
Political civil servants, state level 34.1 34.1 27.3 4.5 
Pennanent civil servants, state level 33.0 35.1 28.2 3.7 
---------._--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mass media 30.9 23.4 38.9 6.9 
Publishers 32.3 35.5 29.0 3.2 
Big business 32.7 28.7 34.7 4.0 
Banks/insurance companies 34.4 26.6 35.9 3.1 
Business associations 48.9 25.6 23.3 2.2 
Small business associations 62.5 31.3 6.3 
Agricultural associations 14.0 20.9 60.5 4.7 
Trade unions 3.7 11.1 68.5 16.7 
Science/higher education 46.2 33.3 20.5 
Military 48.6 28.6 20.0 2.9 
aTbe classification is based on the Kleining-Moore Scale [Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie 
12(1960):86ff.; 20(l968):502ff.l, modified by the level of father's education. 
bPercentaging on the basis of c1assifiable responses. The percentage of c1assifiable responses was, on Ihe average, 
85%. 
extent of the education of their children; modem industrial societies require 
abilities and knowledge which can be acquired only by means of extensive 
education and on-the-job-training. Consequently, today, a formal education is a 
prerequisite for entry into leadership positions. Since this applies to all sectors, 
we did not expect to find large educational differences among the individual 
sectors; the data in Table 2 confirm this hypothesis. 
Usually the education level of elites is very high: about two-thirds of the 
leaders graduated from a university, in contrast to only three percent of the 
general population. This means that a large part of the leadership personnel have 
attended similar educational institutions and have intemalized the same or similar 
norms. This process influences individual communication patterns: as long as a 
high formal level of education is generally recognized as a recruitrnent mecha-
nism, this standard will also be applied to partners and opponents in the political 
interactional process. An equally high educational level in all elite groups can 
thus reduce communication barriers that resuIt from differences in dass origin. 
A high level of formal education has always been characteristic of the top 
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Table 2. Educational Level (percentages) 
Federal govemment/parliament 
State govemments 
Political parties 
Political civil servants, federal level 
Pennanent civil servants, federal level 
Political civil servants, state level 
Pennanent civil servants, state level 
Mass media 
Publishers 
B ig business 
Bankst insurance companies 
Business associations 
Small business associations 
Agricultural associations 
Trade unions 
Science/higher education 
Military 
University 
Degree 
55.6 
70.6 
52.2 
96.2 
97.1 
94.3 
98.1 
32.6 
65.8 
73.4 
75.7 
82.2 
80.0 
64.2 
23.7 
95.6 
22.5 
High Schaol 
Dip/oma 
(Abitur) 
17.2 
11.0 
22.4 
2.6 
2.2 
1.9 
1.0 
55.7 
23.7 
17.3 
12.2 
9.9 
5.0 
9.4 
8.5 
2.2 
75.0 
249 
Lower 
Educationa/ 
Level 
27.3 
18.3 
25.3 
1.3 
0.7 
3.8 
1.0 
11.8 
10.6 
9.2 
12.2 
8.0 
15.0 
26.4 
77.8 
2.2 
2.5 
administrative positions because of the statutory formal entry requirements; quite 
obviously this also applies to the representatives of the scientific-academic 
group-almost exclusively professors-who are correspondingly homogeneous. 
In addition, the economic elites have supplemented the managerial criteria of 
initiative, willingness to take risks, and managerial abilities with academic stud-
ies (Kruk, 1972:73). 
Three groups in particular deviate noticeably from the norm of a high level of 
formal education: union leaders, joumalists, and military leaders. But even in 
these three groups the level of education rose during recent decades (Zapf, 
1965). This also applies to politicians, whose level of education is somewhat 
below the overall elite average. A breakdown by party reflects the earlier social 
background findings: compared to 73.5 percent of university graduates among 
CDU/CSU leaders and 57.5 percent among FOP leaders, of the SPD politicians 
only 46.2 percent are university graduates. 
In summary, the West German elite is not homogeneous, at least with regard 
to class origins and education. Some concentrations were detected in the indica-
tors selected; however, in general, the sectors are too heterogeneous to assume 
patterns of specific and autonomous social recruitment. The social background of 
top position incumbents is thus relatively neutral as far as the interaction among 
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groups is concemed-that is, it neither strengthens the communication barriers 
due to the division of labor nor contributes to the reduction of existing barriers 
due to the lack of social homogeneity. 
Religious ties have traditionally been a part of elite sociaI background analy-
sis, since they may contain a potential for conflict on questions which concem 
the vaIue system of a society. The religious c1eavage was for a long time an 
important characteristic of Gennan social structure which led to social and politi-
cal tensions (Lepsius, 1974). This situation was reflected by the underrepresenta-
tion of Catholics among the political, administrative, economic, and cultural 
leadership of Germany since the founding of the German Empire in 1871 (Lep-
sius, 1974; Zapf, 1965; Peisert, 1967). In the overall elite sampIe 56 pereent 
belonged to the Protestant church and 28.5 percent to the Catholic chureh, 
compared to 49 percent and 44.6 percent in the West German population. 
A relatively balanced relationship (Table 3) between Protestants and Catholies 
is found in the Bundestag sampIe (47.3 percent Protestant, 44.0 percent Catho-
He), which is a result of the overrepresentation of Catholics in the CDU/CSU 
(56.1 percent). In the federal administration-among both political and perma-
nent civil servants-the number of Catholics has increased; this is due in part to 
the previous CDU/CSU govemments and the "religious proportionality arith-
metic" (i.e., Protestant-Catholic balance) wh ich they practiced in top civil 
Table 3. Church Membershipa (percentages) 
No Religious 
Protestant Catholic Affiliation 
FedernI govemmentlparliament 49.0 41.0 9.0 
State govemments 52.4 26.8 18.3 
Political parties 57.4 22.1 20.6 
Political civil servants, federal level 56.4 39.7 3.8 
Pennanent civil servants, federallevel 57.2 34.1 8.7 
Political civil servants, state level 73.6 17.0 9.4 
Pennanent civil servants, stale level 65.9 29.3 4.3 
---------.. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mass media 
Publishers 
Big business 
Banks/insurance companies 
Business associations 
Small business associations 
AgriculturaI associations 
Trade unions 
Science/higher education 
Military 
47.8 
47.4 
57.2 
50.0 
76.2 
65.0 
66.0 
40.3 
67.4 
68.3 
30.4 
34.2 
26.0 
29.7 
16.8 
25.0 
32.1 
32.3 
19.6 
24.4 
aMembership in other churches was mentioned by only nine respondents (0.6%) 
21.4 
18.4 
16.2 
18.9 
5.9 
10.0 
1.9 
27.4 
13.0 
4.9 
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service and other appointments; the number of Catholics in the trade union elite 
results from the existence of specifically Catholic labor organizations. 
However, it should be noted that there are scarcely any religious cleavages in 
the West German population today which could be transmitted into the elite 
stratum. Moreover, the church has lost significance as a value-setting institution. 
This is shown by the fact that a federal govemment was elected which is not 
viewed as one which represents religious interests (Kaltefleiter, 1973:95). The 
growing number of incumbents of top positions without church membership-
which, at almost 13 percent, is twice as high as in the West German population 
(about 6 percent)-likewise supports this assertion. 
Professional Recruitment 
The following considerations are based on the assumption that the behavioral 
potential of a person is determined largely by the intemalization of professional 
norms or role expectations-a hypothesis which is supported by recent empirical 
studies of elite groups (Barton, 1973; Schleth, 1971; Searing, 1968/69). The 
dominant factor in these professional experiences is membership in a particular 
functional group. The intensity of this socialization process depends on the 
duration of the process and on the exclusiveness of such experiences. 
For the different sectors this means that their behavioral potential depends on 
the degree of professionalization-that is, on the extent to which the careers of 
their members are exclusively within that professional area. The more spe-
cialized the career and the more autonomous the recruitment of the sectors, the 
greater will be the prob ability of interelite conflict (Keller, 1968; Enke, 1974; 
Eisenstadt, 1967). Whether this problem is found in the West German leadership 
and, if so, to what extent, will be investigated below on the basis of indicators of 
the sector of one's first position, careers completely in one sector, frequency of 
change of sector, and the extent of intersector elite circulation. 
Indeed, the actual process of professional socialization begins with entry into 
the first professional position. To some extent, however, the "switches" are 
already set for starting out in a particular professional area by the choice of a 
specific field of training or course of academic studies. The relationship between 
the course of studies and the first position proves to be stronger than that between 
the course of studies and present elite sector membership. This indicates that the 
decision about a particular starting position is not equivalent to lasting ties to one 
sector. 
Strictly speaking, one cannot take professionalization to mean that all the 
positions of a respondent from the first to the present one have been held within 
one sector. Concentrating, however, on the first, the most homogeneous group 
seems to be the mass media elite (Table 4). The extent of self-recruitment in the 
administration is surprisingly low, considering the tradition al German concept of 
a career system and of the career civil servant (Laujbahnbeamten). This is so, 
~ 
Federal governmentl parliament 
State govemments 
Political parties 
Political civil servants , federal level 
Pennanent civil servants, federallevel 
Political civil servants, state level 
Permanent civil servants , state level 
Mass media 
Publishers 
Big business 
Banks/insurance companies 
Business associations 
Small business associations 
Agricultural associations 
Trade unions 
Science/higher education 
Military 
Table 4. Professional Socialization Factors (in percentages) 
First Position All Positions Positions in More 
in Present Sector in Same Sector than Two Sectors 
14.0 5.1 44.9 
6.4 4.9 62.2 
21.0 9.0 43.3 
49.4 32.1 25.6 
42.3 29.7 23.2 
43.4 18.9 41.5 
51.5 34.9 16.3 
79.1 61.9 7.1 
45.7 32.4 21.6 
67.5 60.1 10.4 
61.5 54.1 19.0 
24.5 42.6 22.8 
50.0 50.0 15.0 
28.6 32.1 13.2 
15.8 4.8 40.3 
67.4 39.1 17.4 
85.4 2.4 21.9 
Top Position 
in Other Sectors 
8.0 
24.4 
8.8 
10.3 
2.2 
18.9 
3.3 
1.8 
15.8 
1.2 
6.8 
27.7 
15.0 
9.4 
1.6 
2.2 
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even though activities on all administrative levels, including local government, 
were counted as a same-sector start [see Steinkemper (1974) for a discussion of 
the implication of this]. Indeed, an additional II percent of the political and 23 
percent of the permanent civil servants began their careers in the judiciary, i.e., 
in an area that is elose to that of the administration in terms of the substantive 
socialization process. 
The low within-sector recruitment of leaders of business associations can be 
traced to the fact that they usually start their careers in a business enterprise, and 
it is only after a few years that they change to a corresponding association. If 
these people are added, the proportion of within-sector recruitment in this group 
approaches that of the industrialists (about 67 percent); however, these numbers 
are still lower than previous studies led us to expect (Kruk, 1972; Prass and 
Boetticher, 1971). In the trade unions there are comparatively fewer full-time 
salaried positions on the lower organizational levels, where most of the union 
jobs are done on a honorary basis. For this reason, trade union leaders normally 
begin their careers as workers or employees either in the private sector (43.9 
percent) or in the public service sector (31.6 percent). 
The lowest degree of professionalization is found in the political area. This is 
due both to the lack of full-time beginning or "learning" positions in the politi-
cal subsystem and to the view that qualifications gained from a nonpolitical 
profession are an important prerequisite for assuming political functions or 
office. 
The impression of relative heterogeneity of careers gained from the analysis of 
starting positions is confirmed by an analysis of sector change over the entire 
Course of professional careers (see Table 4). Only a third of the elite members 
held positions exelusively in one sector over the course of their entire careers; in 
fact, about one-quarter have been active in at least three sectors. Especially high 
is the number of sector changers in the political area: only 5 percent ofthe overall 
political elite sampie have had exclusively political careers, whereas one-half 
had professional experiences in at least three areas. There were only insignificant 
differences among the political parties. 
Journalists demonstrated the greatest homogeneity, followed by economic 
leadership groups. In these areas, exchange mainly takes place with only one 
other sector; apart from this, there is little intersector exchange, even less than in 
the group of top civil servants. The members of the military elite stand out by 
their high rate of extrasector recruitment, in contrast to the high rate of within-
starting positions: only 2 percent can look back on exclusively military careers, 
compared to about three-quarters who were active in at least one other profes-
sional area; an explanation of this is that these other professional activities were 
often transitional positions that bridged the period between the end of the World 
War II and the formation of the West German armed forces (Bundeswehr). 
Often taken as a further indicator of career homogeneity/heterogeneity is the 
extent of elite circulation, i.e., the exchange of top position holders among the 
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various sectors (Mills, 1956; Enke, 1974; Porter, 1966). Indeed, about one-third 
of the rnembers of the elite had previously held a top position, but only 8 percent 
had held one in another sector. One can thus hardly speak of a high rate of elite 
circulation. An exception to this general pattern is the state govemment elite, 
which is recruited, to a large extent, from among top civil servants, a related 
area. In contrast to this, election to the Bundestag takes place almost exclusively 
from arnong those having apreelite status. Because of the risks involved in 
elective political office, potential leaders on the higher rungs of the career ladder 
are normally lost to politics (von Beyme, 1971). Moreover, a parliamentary 
career has become increasingly unattractive, especially for industrialists and 
businessmen, since today other more effective ways of interest articulation are 
available [see Neumann (1979) for a discussion ofthis point]. Economic associa-
tion leaders exhibit an above-average rate of elite circulation, most of which, 
however, involves exchange with the business sector; there, too, elite exchange 
takes place only between related sectors. 
In summary, we can say that during a professional career, experiences are 
often gathered from different sectors, with considerable variations among the 
elite groups in the extent of intersector exchange. However, upon achieving a top 
position there is practically no more change, or at best, only between related 
sectors. When this primarily formal consideration of career structures is supple-
mented by a c1assification of the specific area activities over the course of entire 
careers (Table 5), affinities between certain sectors are seen which can modify 
the results of previous studies of social and professional recruitment. 
In the first place, it was found that a large majority of each group-between 
70 and almost 100 percent-had already held at least one position in their present 
sector before their current one; as a rule, the last steps of the career ladder are 
within one sector. However, this does not explain anything about the time 
preceding this stage-whether, and to what extent, varied activities were per-
formed and thereby different socialization experiences were undergone. 
The political elites are recruited on the broadest base; they combine personnel 
from all the other groups, which supports the impression of heterogeneous career 
patterns that has been found in this study. The present position of almost 30 
percent of the politicians is the first political office that they have held; they were 
previously active exclusively in other sectors. A breakdown of politicalleaders 
by party reveals several contrasting differences: whereas there is an above-
average proportion of former civil servants among CDU/CSU leaders, the SPD 
has the most trade unionists, and middle-c1ass professions dominate in the FDP . 
. In the ministerial bureaucracy it is also seen that a large number of "out-
sId~rs" rose to leading positions, many of whom had previously never been 
actIve in the administration. This proportion is naturally higher among political 
than among permanent civil servants; it is noticeably high among state ministrY 
~ead~, for ab~ut one-third of whom their present position is their first admin-
IstratIve functlOn. The largest group of civil servants with occupational experi-
'" ::Io 
.~ 
> 
a o 
<!:: 
E 
§ 
·e 
~ 
Big 
Busi- Small 
ness Banks! Business Business! Labor Or- Science! Judiciary 
Admini- Mass Enter- Insur- Associa- Pro- Agri- ganiza- Higher Educa- (Without 
Politics stration Media prises ance tions fessionals culture tions Education tion Lawyers) 
Federal govemmentlparliament 71.()b 16.0 21.0 14.0 2.0 4.0 16.0 10.0 8.0 11.0 8.0 14.0 
State govemments 70.7 32.9 9.8 9.8 4.9 8.5 20.7 6.1 13.4 18.3 13.4 18.3 
Political parties 76.5 16.2 14.7 16.2 4.4 22.1 4.4 10.3 8.8 11.8 14.8 
Political civil servants, federal level 17.9 87.2 2.6 16.7 2.6 2.6 10.3 1.3 7.7 20.5 2.6 15.4 
Pennanent civil servants, federal level 7.2 92.0 5.8 15.2 2.2 3.6 3.6 0.7 1.4 15.9 5.1 24.6 
Political civil servants, state level 18.9 66.0 9.4 17.0 1.9 5.7 \3.2 3.8 7.5 20.8 9.4 18.9 
Pennanent civil servants, state level 9.6 90.0 2.4 9.1 2.4 3.3 8.1 3.8 3.3 10.5 6.7 25.8 
N 
01 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------_ .. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------_ .. ---------------
01 
Mass media 4.0 3.6 98.2 5.8 0.9 1.3 0.4 4.0 7.6 5.4 1.8 
Publishers 10.5 5.3 84.2 18.4 2.6 15.8 2.6 5.3 7.9 5.3 
Big business 1.7 11.6 1.7 88.4 1.7 6.4 \6.8 \.l \.l 15.0 2.3 9.2 
Banks/insurance companies 5.4 10.8 2.7 24.3 82.4 5.4 10.8 1.4 1.4 5.4 6.8 13.9 
Business associations 11.9 13.9 4.0 46.5 5.9 52.5 17.8 1.0 3.0 16.8 3.0 13.5 
SmaJl business associations 20.0 15.0 20.0 15.0 80.0 5.0 5.0 10.0 
Agricultural associations 13.2 17.0 13.2 9.4 3.8 1.9 83.0 26.4 5.7 3.8 
Trade unions 16.1 17.7 6.5 32.3 3.2 1.6 9.7 80.6 1.6 24.2 8.1 
Science/higher education 6.5 13.0 4.3 26.1 4.3 6.5 8.7 100.0 6.5 4.3 
Military 7.3 36.6 19.5 39.0 2.4 9.8 2.4 2.4 12.2 7.3 2.4 
"Other areas were hardly mentioned, so they are not considered here. A coding of the exchange with the military area could not be done sinee it could not be determined from the responses 
what the exact status of the military service was, i.e., whether draftee or professional soldier. Tbe number who had military service was about the same for all sectors-between 20 and 30 
percent. 
bBecause of multiple responses, the totals may exceed 100%. 
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ence outside the administration is recruited from other areas of public service, 
such as science and education or justice, but a considerable group also comes 
from the industrial sector. Moreover, almost one-fifth of the political civil ser-
vants had acquired political experience. The administration itself represents, next 
to business and industry, the most significant pool for all other sectors. Jour-
nalists exhibit the highest degree of autonomy; they showalmost exclusively 
intrasector recruitment patterns and they supply few, if any, personnel to other 
sectors. 
Business groups are recruited on a relatively broad basis. However, the afore-
mentioned selection mechanism begins early and leads to comparatively homo-
geneous careers-there is subsequent exchange of personnel only from big busi-
ness companies to the business associations. It is striking that the business 
associations, as the special organized interest representation for this sector, send 
fewer personnel to the political and administrative areas than do big business, 
smal1 business, and professionals. These latter groups additionally serve as re-
cruitment bases for a11 other groups. 
The recruitment of union leaders is also heterogeneous, but with concentra-
tions in the industrial sector and in public service (administration and education). 
Few personnel are supplied to other sectors, though some go to the political elite, 
almost exclusively the SPD. 
What significance can be attributed to these recruitment patterns with regard to 
communication and cooperation among the elites? The political-administrative 
area is placed at the center of the multiple crisscrossing professional connections. 
In the political-administrative elite an understanding of the specific interests and 
concems of almost a11 other social groups included in this study is acquired and 
integrated. Barriers due to social background and education-especially in the 
political area-are to a great extent dismantled, so that an openness to commu-
nication and cooperation on the part of both groups can be expected. However, 
there is a greater affinity between politicians and union leaders, on the one hand, 
and civil servants and business leaders, on the other (a relation that we shall 
discuss later). Near the edge of the elite exchange process-and therefore proba-
bly also of the interactional process-are to be found the leaders of the mass 
media; for them, however, an independent and autonomous position seems 
appropriate. 
In summary, with regard to either social or professional recruitment we cannot 
speak of a homogeneous leadership stratum. However, neither can we find the 
other extreme pattern of autonomous, homogeneous elites, made possible by 
differentiation of tasks and division of labor, which has often been postulated to 
exist in Germany . 
POLITICAL BELIEFS 
The term political beliefs is used here as a global concept under which a number 
of different assessments and evaluations of specific aspects of West German 
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society and politics are subsumed. Assessment of the distribution of power, 
evaluations of this power distribution, support for or opposition to a number of 
politicaJ goals, and basic questions of the political opinion-formation process 
will be analyzed. Thus, our approach here will differ from that of previous 
sections, since more than only elite sector membership will be considered. Elite 
sector membership is of course an important independent variable in the forma-
tion of political beliefs (e. g., Edinger and Searing, 1967), but in addition to it a 
second variable, the party preference of the respondents, will be investigated. 
This is important in two ways. First, a relationship between elite sector mem-
bership and party preference can be presumed. Second, party preference assurnes 
an important role with regard to specific political beliefs because, in Western 
democracies wh ich do not have segmented political subcultures, the dominant 
camps of social conflict are defined in conflicts between or among the political 
parties (see, e.g., Hoffmann-Lange, 1977; Lepsius, 1973; Massing, 1974). 
The comparison between the party politicians and the other sectors helps to 
identify more party-specific conflicts in contrast to more sector-specific con-
flicts, and to answer the question as to what extent the existing party system is 
able to transform the sector-specific conflicts into political conflicts. 
Party Preference and Party Membership 
Before presenting the results of the analyses, a few notes concerning the nature 
of the party system at the time of the survey are necessary. The reformation of 
the political parties after World War 11 led to a large number of parties and to a 
fragmentation of the party system during the first years of the Federal Republic. 
Since then the party system has shrunk to three parties which together hold more 
than 90 percent of the seats in the Bundestag. These are the Christian Democratic 
Party (CDU/CSU), the CSU (Christian Social Union) being limited to Bavaria; 
the liberal Free Democratic Party (FDP); and the Social Democratic Party (SPD). 
On the federal level the "bourgeois" parties (CDU/CSU and FDP) were 
dominant during the postwar period. During the decade of the 1950s the 
CDU/CSU increased its share at the cost of the small splinter parties, while the 
electoral results for its coalition partner, the FDP, fluctuated at around 10 percent 
of the votes. The SPD was at first relatively weak (about 30 percent), but by 
expanding into a "catchall" party, it not only increased its proportion of the 
votes but also became an acceptable coalition partner for the other parties. 
However, only between 1972 and 1976 did it hold a plurality of the seats in the 
Bundestag. 
After internal crises in the CDU/CSU and increasing tensions in the governing 
coalition of the CDU /CSU and the FDP there evolved a grand coalition between 
the two large parties, the CDU/CSU and the SPD, in 1966. At this time a shift 
within the FDP in favor of the social-liberal wing of the party took place. In 1969 
this party formed a coalition with the SPD, in spite of a narrow parliamentary 
majority. This social-liberal coalition maintained a majority in the Bundestag 
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until 1982 while the CDU/CSU continued to dominate the Bundesrat (Federal 
Council, the second chamber ofthe legislature). In the spring of 1972, at the time 
when our elite survey was carried out, the political climate was especially 
strained: the federal government in May 1972 barely survived a vote of no 
confidence. 
The 250 politicians interviewed in this study are distributed among the four 
parties as folIows: 
100 SPD politicians 
83 CDU politicians 
24 CSU politicians 
42 FDP politicians 
(40.0%) 
(33.2%) 
(9.6%) and 
(16.8%)4 
In other sectors the business leaders5 and the military, in particular, show a dear 
affinity for the CDU /CSU, and the union leaders express an equally dear affinity 
for the SPD, while the administration, mass media, publishers, and science 
leaders distribute their partisan preferences more evenly among all political 
parties. 
A comparison of the party preferences of all the nonpolitical sectors with the 
resuIts of the 1969 and the 1972 federal elections shows cIear differences be-
tween the party preferences of West German elites and the general electorate: 
Nonpolitical elite 
Federal elections 
Federal elections 
1972 
1969 
1972 
SPD 
29.5% 
42.7% 
45.8% 
FDP 
13.4% 
5.8% 
8.4% 
CDUICSU 
51.7% 
46.1% 
44.9% 
Support for the CDUICSU and for the FDP is higher, and support for the SPD 
lower, among the nonpolitical elite than in the electorate. The rate of party 
membership ofthe nonpolitical elite (Table 6) is strikingly high~about 10 times 
the rate of the general electorate (39.3 percent, compared to only about 4 
percent). 
In this general pattern we see, however, dear sector-specific differences: the 
lowest proportion of party members is found among military leaders, business 
leaders, and the press, whereas the highest proportion of party members is found 
in the trade unions. The relatively large number of party members in the admin-
istration and in radio and television can be explained as primarily due to the fact 
that appointments to leadership positions in these sectors are increasingly domi-
nated by the political parties. 6 
Attitudes towards Democratic "Rules of the Game" 
The theory of democratic elitism proceeds from the assumption that a mini-
mum consensus on basic democratic values (the so-called mIes of the game) is a 
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TabLe 6. Party Preferences (percentages) 
Party Preference 
No Party Party 
SPD FDP CDU/CSU Preference Members 
Political civil servants, federal level 46.2 21.8 24.4 7.7 53.8 
Pennanent civil servants, federal level 34.1 15.9 37.0 13.0 34.8 
Political civil servants, state level 37.7 15.1 39.6 7.5 84.9 
Pennanent civil servants, state level 27.8 10.5 57.9 3.8 55.5 
.. _------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -------------
Mass media: press 41.5 16.9 38.5 3.1 20.8 
Mass media: radio/television 56.4 7.4 34.1 2.1 51.1 
Publishers 23.7 23.7 50.0 2.6 28.9 
Big business 8.7 11.0 75.8 4.6 19.1 
Banks/insurance companies 17.6 9.5 73.0 32.4 
Business associations 5.9 16.8 69.3 7.9 24.8 
Small business associations 10.0 15.0 65.0 10.0 30.0 
Agricultural associations 7.5 17.0 73.6 1.9 41.5 
Irade unions 74.2 3.2 21.0 1.6 88.7 
Science/higher education 43.5 23.9 30.5 2.2 28.3 
Military 9.8 2.4 73.1 14.6 
necessary prerequisite, above all among the elites, for the successful functioning 
of a democratic political system. Many studies have found that this consensus is 
higher among political activists than among the general electorate. The former 
are therefore characterized as the "carriers of the creed" (Prothro and Grigg, 
1969:239). 
In the following, we investigate whether such a consensus on basic democratic 
values exists among the West German leadership stratum and, if so, wh ich 
values such a consensus includes. In this connection another question can be 
answered. It is often contended that the rejection of the roles of the game of 
democratic politics by a large part of the German elite contributed decisively to 
the downfall ofthe Weimar Republic while, at the same time, the high degree of 
continuity of leadership groups in the German administration and in the economy 
was retained. The quest ion therefore arises of whether this assertion still applies 
a quarter of a century after the founding of the Federal Republic of Germany. 
Answers to these questions are based on elite respondents' judgments of seven 
statements which contain acceptance of govemmental control, the interplay of 
govemment and opposition, pluralistic power play, general elections, and the 
principle of (political) compromise (see Table 7). One can find a real consensus, 
operationally defined as more than 80 percent agreement among all elite groups, 
conceming only two of the seven statements of the democratic rules of the game. 
These relate to the readiness to compromise in political disputes and the decision 
of the citizenry on the formation of govemments and govemmental pro grams via 
general elections. A consensus of over 60 percent in all groups, except the 
economic (57.8 percent), was also found conceming a statement about the prece-
N 
0\ o 
Percentage 01 disapprovallor: 
In the Federal Republic an effective 
public control of the governrnent is 
of less importance than the fact that 
there exists a strong, purposeful, and 
efficient government. 
Stability and continuity of politicaJ 
leadership are more important for the 
FederaJ Republic than the highest 
possible chance of replacing the gov-
eming party by the opposition. 
Democracy in West Germany is possi-
ble in the long run only if a strong 
political leadership disregards all 
group interests. 
Table 7. Attitudes Toward Democratic Rules of the Game 
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The general well-being in the Federal 
Republic and the interests of the en-
tire population are basically en-
dangered by the continuous demands 
and disputes of the pressure groups. 70.1 61.9 41.0 42.9 53.0 62.6 52.8 50.3 85.5 68.9 51.3 
It is not necessary to decide conflicts 
openly in order to find socially just 
solutions. 60.8 71.4 53.9 45.0 57.8 69.5 50.0 38.9 70.5 64.4 61.5 
Percentage oJ approval Jor: 
Even the one who is right in a dispute 
should be ready to search for a com-
promise. 92.8 81.0 93.5 85.7 89.6 86.5 91.9 91.1 79.0 84.1 87.2 
In a democracy the population must 
have the highest influence possible 
on the composition and program of 
N the govemment by voting in general 
0"- elections. 93.5 85.7 85.3 75.0 86.2 84.7 86.5 88.0 86.9 93.2 87.2 ..... 
aThe groups in these areas were combined, since there were practically no attitudinal differences among them. 
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dence of public control vis-a-vis the freedom of action of the govemment. On alI 
other statements agreement is lower, sometimes below 50 percent. 7 This corre-
sponds to empirical findings in the United States (Prothro and Grigg, 1969; 
McClosky, 1964). Even within the leadership stratum the consensus on demo-
cratic values is more partial and fragmentary than complete. 
In order to provide a comparison among groups, the mean rate of agreement 
was calculated for each group; this yielded the foJlowing rank-ordering: 
Trade unions 
SPD politicians 
FDP politicians 
Mass media 
Science and higher education 
Publishers 
Ministerial bureaucracy 
Armed forces 
eDU politicians 
Business 
esu politicians 
78.1% 
75.7% 
74.5% 
72.9% 
71.8% 
68.2% 
65.4% 
63.4% 
60.1% 
58.9% 
55.2% 
Thus, throughout, there are rather marked differences within and among the 
elite groups in the area of democratic values. The two groups traditionally 
regarded as more authoritarian-administration and business-are so in the 
lower level of adherence to basic democratic values, but they do not depart 
substantially from the overall elite average (63.6 percent). There is, therefore, no 
continuation in the Federal Republic of Germany of the dichotomy between the 
prosystem politicaI parties and other elite groups (antisystem groups) which was 
characteristic of the Weimar Republic. To be sure, the consensus on these items 
is in general not especiaIly high, but the values which are basic to the legitimacy 
and functioning of a democratic order-namely, acceptance of the principle of 
general elections and willingness to compromise-nevertheless find broad en-
dorsement by all groups. 
Over and above the acceptance of the democratic rules of the game, a minimal 
consensus on substantive issues is required for the successful functioning of a 
pluralistic social order; most important is consensus on the basic principles of the 
economic order (Bachrach, 1962; Lehmbruch, 1969)-specifically, in the 
Federal Republic of Germany, in support of the "social market economy" 
(Soziale Marktwirtschaft). This position is supported by more than 80 percent of 
the interviewed elites in aIl groups. Their attitudes toward European integration, 
which in the long run will decisively influence the national decision-making 
structures, also reveaIs consensus: the issue "renunciation of national sov-
ereignty in favor of European unity" finds broad agreement (a minimum of 85 
percent in all groups). 
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Evaluation of Political Issues 
In the analysis of differences of opinion over political goals it should be borne 
in mind that a certain amount of disagreement between groups is not only 
unavoidable but is even desirable. Too extensive an agreement would be an 
indication that the conflicts which inevitably come about in a society are not 
reflected in the attitudes of the leaders or that their manifestation is suppressed. 
In order to determine political cleavages among elite groups, the respondents 
were asked to evaluate a list of current political issues. These can be summarized 
as foIIows: 8 
A. Foreign policy 
1. Strengthening of the defense potential of NATO (Western alliance) 
2. Formal recognition of the German Dernocratic Republic (GOR) 
3. The greatest danger for the Western Oemocracies continues to be 
aggressive world communism, which must be opposed strongly 
B. Economic policy 
I. Extension of workers' codetermination 
2. Restriction of the right to dispose of landed property 
3. Preservation of the independent middle c1ass 
4. Redistribution of wealth 
C. Sodal policy and sodal-moral values 
I. Liberalization of criminal law 
2. Introduction of the comprehensive school 
3. A lot can be said in favor of introducing the death penalty for 
certain crimes in the Federal Republic 
4. Education of youth for adaptation to the existing social order 
5. Freedom of opinion and discussion must reach its limits at the point 
where basic moral beliefs and values are concemed 
Among politicians the following pattern is found (Table 8): SPO and FDP 
leaders take almost identical positions on foreign policy and social policy, the 
two areas which, at the time of the interviews, formed the basis of the work of 
the coalition. The goals in both areas originated with and were propagated by the 
coalition parties among the public under the slogans "Eastern policy" (detente 
and negotiations with the USSR, East Germany, and the other East-bloc coun-
tries) and "internal reforms" (liberalization of criminallaw and prison reform, 
educational reforms. and general democratization). In contrast, in the area of 
economic policy the FDP leaders are c1early more conservative than those of the 
SPD and stand c10ser to CDU/CSU leaders. CDU politicians have the same 
views as CSU leaders on foreign and economic policy, but on social policy 
questions the CSU leaders are more conservative. The differences between SPD 
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Table 8. Attitudes Toward Foreign, Economic, 
and Socia! Policiesa 
Foreign Economic Social 
Policy Policy Policy 
SPD politicians 3.6 4.6 4.7 
FDP politicians 3.6 3.5 4.8 
CDU politicians 1.6 3.0 3.1 
CSU politicians 1.6 2.6 2.4 
CDU/CSU politicians together 1.6 2.9 2.9 
Ministerial bureaucracyb 2.8 3.5 3.7 
Mass media 3.3 3.9 4.4 
Publishers 3.0 3.3 3.8 
Businessb 2.5 2.5 3.2 
Trade unions 3.7 4.9 4.7 
Science/higher education 3.7 3.8 4.3 
Military 2.0 3.0 2.9 
"The scale ranges from I to 6. with a higher value indicating a progressive. prochange 
position and a lower value indicating a conservati ve position. 
"The various groups of the ministerial bureaucracy and in the economy were com-
bined. since !here were no attitudinal differences among them. 
and CDU/CSU leaders in all issue areas are great, and the distance between the 
SPD and CSU is especially marked. 
Comparing the issue positions of the other elite groups with those of the 
politicians (Table 9), we find that the administrative elite falls in the middle 
between the parties in all three issue areas. This fact corresponds both to their 
normative role definition in tenns of (politieal) "neutrality," as weIl as to the 
relatively balanced distribution of party preferences in this sector. Representa-
tives of the mass media and of science and higher education take the SPD 
position on foreign and social policies, but fall in the middle (between SPD and 
CDU/CSU positions) on matters of economic policy. Union leaders show a elear 
affinity with the SPD in all three issue areas; in contrast, economic leaders take 
stands elose to the CDU/CSU on economic and social policy, although they 
elearly take amiddie position on foreign poliey issues. 
The military elite underlines its clear affinity with the CDU/CSU in all three 
issue areas; this corresponds to their predominantly CDU/CSU party preference. 
The issue positions of the publishers are the least "partisan": they are more 
progressive on foreign policy issues, between the SPD and CDU/CSU on social 
policy, and stand elose to the CDU/CSU position on economic policy-which 
corresponds to their interests as businessmen. 
In foreign and social policy the differences between the two major parties 
(SPD and CDU/CSU) define the limits of the political speetrum: in these issue 
areas the cleavages are defined by the political parties. Economic policy is a 
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Table 9. Issue Positions of the Leadership Groups with Regard 
to Those of SPD and CDU/CSU Politicians 
1. Foreign poliey 
2. Economic poliey 
3. Social poliey 
FDP 
SPD 
Position 
Mass media 
Publishers 
Trade unions 
Scienee/higher edueation 
Trade unions 
FDP 
Mass media 
Trade unions 
Scienee/higher edueation 
Intermediate Positiona 
Ministerial bureaucraey 
Business 
FDP 
Ministerial bureaucraey 
Mass media 
Scienee/higher edueation 
Ministerial bureaucraey 
Publishers 
CDU/CSU 
Position 
Military 
Publishers 
Business 
Military 
Business 
Military 
aIssue positions were defined as "intennediate" wh ich deviated more than 0.5 scaIe-points from both the SPD and 
the CDU/CSU positions. 
different case. Here the distance between business and the unions is greater than 
that between the political parties. Nevertheless, this divergence, too, is reflected 
by the distance between Social and Christian Democrats. This confirrns the role 
of the parties as institutions wh ich not only express conflicts anchored in the 
socia! structure but also actively structure political options. 
Assessment of Influence Structure 
This analysis of political c1eavages leads to important conclusions about the 
potential for conflict among the groups, but, taken by itself, does not permit any 
statement to be made about the extent to which these conflicts are actualized in 
the policy formation process. Concrete elite behavior is influenced not only by 
the goals of the elites but also to a considerable extent by their perceptions of the 
influence structure, which indicate their subjective estimates of the chance they 
have to implement their goals. Estimates of their own influence, as weil as of the 
influence of their political opponents and other • 'political" actors, is therefore of 
great significance. However, these are not objective data about actual influence, 
since they are shaped by their personal experiences. Congruent assessments of 
the influence of a "political" actor by different groups permit conclusions to be 
drawn about the application of a common frame of reference for their estimates. 
This makes consensus formation easier, in that sanctions threatened by this actor 
will be assessed similarly by all parties to the conflict. 
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If the estimates of influenee of the groups are homogeneous, and if, moreover, 
the influenee of two aetors is estimated as very different, the confliet potential 
between these two actors is presumably smalI, since the weaker partner will not 
enter into apparently hopeless power struggles. On the other hand, independent 
of the homogeneity of influence estimates, the eonfliet potential is always es-
pecially high when two eompetitors eonsider themselves equally influential. The 
strength of the eonfliet depends upon how important the upcoming deeisions are 
for the aetors eoneemed and how mueh their goals diverge from eaeh other. In 
the ease of important deeisions, sharply divergent goals, and strongly pereeived 
ehanees of suecess, conflicts between two actors will therefore be espeeially 
intense. Estimates of the strength of influence of 27 political actors-political 
institutions, administration, interest groups, the mass media, and the eleeto-
rate-by the leadership groups yielded the following rank-ordering on a si x-
point scale, with higher values indicating greater influence on politics: 
Federal government 5.6 
Federal parliament (Bundestag) 5.3 
SPD 5.2 
"Political parties" 5. J 
CDU 4.6 
Television 4.6 
Trade unions 4.6 
CSU 4.4 
Press 4.4 
Administration/ministerial bureaucracy 4.3 
State govemments 4.1 
Federal Council (Bundesrat) 4.1 
FDP 4.0 
Employers/industrial associations 3.9 
FederaJ Bank 3.8 
FederaJ Constitutional Court 3.8 
Radio 3.7 
Big business 3.7 
Voters 3.6 
Banks 3.6 
Agricultural Association 3.6 
Catholic Church 3.5 
Protestant Church 3.0 
Science 2.8 
President of the Federal Republic (Bundespräsident) 2.6 
Armed forces (Bundeswehr) 2.3 
In comparison to the large differences in the evaluation of political goals, here 
the differenees in the group estimates of influence are not large. Thus, theyare 
good preconditions for effeetive communication between elite groups. When one 
looks at the strength of influence ascribed to individual sectors, the central 
politieal institutions rank first, and c1early ahead of the estimated influence of the 
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Tahte 10. Comparative Assessment of the Influence of Big Business 
and the Trade Unions (percentages) 
267 
Big Business Both Equally Trade Unions 
More Influential Influential More lrifluential 
SPD politicians 23.2 42.1 34.7 
FDP politicians 23.8 31.0 45.2 
CDU politicians 5.1 24.4 70.5 
CSU politicians 22.7 77.3 
Ministerial bureaucracy 5.8 31.2 63.0 
Mass media 23.5 33.0 43.4 
Publishers 2.6 31.6 65.8 
Business 5.6 16.9 77.5 
Irade unions 40.0 26.7 33.3 
Science/higher education 8.7 39.1 52.2 
Military 4.9 24.4 70.7 
mass media, administration, and trade unions; business interest groups were 
pereeived to be even less influential. This shows that none of the leadership 
groups interpret the distribution of power in the Federal Republie in terms of the 
Marxist "Stamokap" theory (theory of state monopoly capitalism). 
Table 10 shows respondents' assessments of the relative influence of business 
and labor. lt is striking that the unions are held by many respondents to be more 
influential than business organizations. This result can be traeed to the dose 
eonnection of the trade unions with the SPD as the leading party on the federal 
level. A second factor eontributing to this result may be that the influence of 
business interests is not perceived as strong, because it is less visible. Since the 
difference in the estimations of the strength of influence of unions and business 
associations is only 0.7 sc ale points, on the basis of the foregoing eonsiderations 
it may be assumed that the goal confliet which we identified in the area of 
eeonomic poliey will be strongly expressed because of the near-equality of the 
assessed chances of success of both business and unions. 
The Relative Importance of Party Preference and Sector as 
Independent Variables 
In the following analysis we will examine to what extent the attitudes of the 
nonpolitical sectors are not expressions of functional-specific interests but mere-
ly the result of different distributions of party preferences. Here we see whether 
party preference or sector is more decisive for the structuring of political be-
liefs. 9 First we observe how much the supporters of the different parties differ in 
their views on foreign policy, economic policy, and domestic poliey. CDU/CSU 
supporters are taken together, which is justified in view of the small differences 
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between these two parties. Table 11 shows clearly that in foreign policy and 
social policy the differences between SPD and CDU/CSU supporters within the 
individual sectors are greater throughout than those between the business and 
union representatives within the groups of party supporters. This confinns the 
already stated supposition that these policy areas involve political issues for 
which the alternatives are defined within the political sector. Here distances 
between the politicians are the greatest. In the economic area, in contrast, great 
differences are found both among the supporters of the various parties and also 
among the members of the different sectors . The largest difference, by far, exists 
between SPD supporters in the trade unions (mean scale value 5.1) and 
CDU/CSU supporters in the business sector (2.3). Interesting in this regard is the 
intermediate position of persons with "contradictory" party preferences-
namely, SPD supporters in business (mean scale value 3.6) and CDU/CSU 
supporters in the trade unions (4.0). This result is consistent with the thesis ofthe 
moderating effect of cross-pressures on political attitudes. JO The intennediate 
position of the FDP on questions of economic policy, as noted above, is con-
firmed also in the double distribution by sector and party preference. Nev-
ertheless, there are dear differences between FDP supporters in the mass media, 
Table 11. Attitudinal Differencesa among Sectors 
and Between Groups of Party Supporters 
(mean differences) 
Foreign Economic Social 
Policy Policy Policy 
Distance SPD and CDUICSU, 
by sector:b 
Politics 2.0 1.7 1.8 
Ministerial bureaucracy 1.4 1.2 1.3 
Mass media 1.7 1.1 1.0 
Publishers 1.8 1.8 1.5 
Business 1.3 1.3 1.5 
Trade unions 1.5 1.1 1.1 
Science/higher education 1.8 1.1 1.4 
Distance between business and 
labor" by party supporters: 
SPD supporters 0.5 1.5 0.6 
CDU/CSU supporters 0.3 1.7 1.0 
·ScaIe range of 1 to 6, low values are conservative. 
bBecause there were too few cases (Iess Ihan 10) of SPD/FDP supporters arnong the 
military. the latter group is not included here. 
cThere were only two union leaders wilh FDP preferences; difference values were 
therefore not calculated for Ihe FDP. 
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Table 12. Relationshipsa of Party Preference, Sector, Age, Religion, 
and Social Background with Political Beliefs 
Democratic Rules 
ofthe Gameb 
PoUtical lssues 
"Strong 
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Foreign Economic Social Government" .. P luraUst" 
Policy Policy Policy Position Position 
Party preference .65 .64 .63 .29 .37 
Sector .35 .55 .45 .28 .33 
Religionc .33 .26 .33 .14 .17 
Social background .12 .23 .15 .03 .12 
Age -.27 -.24 -.36 -.23 -.29 
"Eta values. excepl for the age variable (correlation coefficient). 
bScores for "strong govemment" are for a combination of items land 2; scores for "pluralism" are for items 3 to 
5 from Table 7. 
cThe highest values are for a religious variable based on a combination of church membership and frequency of 
church attendance. 
who are closer to the position of SPD politicians, and FDP supporters in the 
business sector, who are closer to the views of CDU/CSU politicians. 
Whereas in questions of economic policy party preference and sector influence 
the views of leadership groups, party preference clearly has greater power in the 
other two issue areas. This result is confirmed when one attempts to estimate the 
global effect of these two variables on the attitudes of the elite respondents in the 
three issue areas. The values in Table 12 clearly show the outstanding role of 
party preference, whereby, in quest ions of economic policy the sector influences 
political views almost as much as does party preference. Age and religion have a 
certain influenee on views about current political issues, but this is not the case 
for the social background variable. 
Consensus and Conflict in Political Beliefs 
The above analyses of political beliefs have shown two closely interrelated 
main lines of cleavage. The first concems the political power distribution among 
the parties, as weIl as current controversies in the areas of foreign and social 
poliey, Here there is some difference of opinion between the parties ofthe social-
liberal coalition as regards foreign and social policy introduced by the SPD/FDP 
federal govemment. The sectors of the mass media, trade unions, and science 
and education follow more closely the line of the federal govemment, whereas 
the military and business leaders support more strongly the CDU/CSU position 
in these issue areas, The second conflict concems economic issues and lies 
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between the sectors of business and the unions. In this context the CDU/CSU 
politicians support business interests, whereas the SPD politicians support union 
interests. The FDP, as weil as the mass media and science and education sectors, 
take an intermediate position in this issue area, whereas publishers and the 
military identify with the business position. This second cleavage is especially 
explosive for three reasons: 
I. As a traditional conflict between employers and employees it displays a 
high degree of continuity. 
2. The great differences found between the groups indicate the relatively 
high degree of intensity of this conflict. 
3. The perceived chances of success of the groups which are participants in 
this conflict are rather dose, so that the probability of confrontations is 
relatively high. 
Two additional conflict potentials are related to the exercise of political influ-
ence: the influence of the political administration/bureaucracy and that of televi-
sion-estimated as relatively great by all groups-is viewed with distrust by a 
considerable portion of the respondents in all other sectors . This points to a lack 
of legitimation of this influence, since the two current models of the legitimation 
of political influence-control through democratic elections or by the pluralistic 
balance of interests-are not applicable to these two sectors. Nevertheless, the 
probability that the conflict potentials we have found can be expressed within the 
framework of the existing political order, and thereby without recourse to vio-
lence, must be considered relatively great on the basis of several of our other 
findings. Among these are the general acceptance of the influence of the central 
political institutions, the thoroughly positive evaluation of the social market 
economy, and finally, the willingness to compromise in disputes which charac-
terizes the great majority in all elite groups. 
COMMUNICATION PATTERNS 
The process of conflict articulation and consensus formation in pluralist systems 
is, as already mentioned, a complex process of communication and interaction. 
As has been shown in the previous analyses, the conditions for peaceful conflict 
resolution in the Federal Republic of Germany are favorable. In the following 
section the communication patterns among the leadership groups will be de-
scribed by analyzing the formalized interaction and communication potentials 
which the system makes available to elites. 
Multiple Officeholding 
The analysis of the social and professional recruitment of leadership groups 
has shown that there are distances among the individualleadership groups, but 
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these are not marked enough to make communication among groups difficult. In 
addition, differentiated systems make available formalized interaction potentials, 
such as offices and memberships in several sectors and inclusion in commissions 
and advisory boards in the political-administrative system (i.e., interlocking 
positions), for the reduction of such social distances. The exchange of experi-
ences with members of other sectors made possible by these potentials transmits 
knowledge of the norms, values, and problems among the various sectors. The 
personal relationships and informal contacts made here facilitate communication 
and compromise. 
Before the connections of the sec tors to one another-based on multiple office 
holding-are analyzed, it is necessary to present an overview ofthe use made of 
this potential for communication. Thereby the number of sectors, but not the 
number of offices per sector will be considered, since it is here mainly a matter of 
the intersector connections and not of the multiple office holding of individuals. 
The political-administrative sectors will be treated in the following analysis as a 
single unit and will be contrasted to the societal sectors. 
On this basis the 1560 elite respondents held a total of 1270 positions outside 
of their own area. This rate of interlock must be considered relatively low, since 
there were frequent multiple responses. The interlocking positions are found in 
these sectors and proportions: 
Business 18.5% 
Science 15.0% 
Banks/insurance companies 11.8% 
Education 9.5% 
Business associations 9.4% 
Politics 8.6% 
Mass Media 7.7% 
Churches 5.3% 
Administration, federal/state level 5.0% 
Social sector 4.7% 
Labor and employees' associations 2.4% 
Agriculture 2.0% 
The picture conveyed by the figures in Table 13 is similar to that of profes-
sional recruitment: the political-administrative sectors stand in the middle of the 
system of sector interlock. The members of the political-administrative lead-
ership stratum hold one-half of the positions in the private sectors (top politi-
cians, 19.3 percent; top civil servants, 30.7 percent). However, the spectrum of 
interlock with other sectors is broader for the political elite than it is for the 
administrative elite. Among the top politicians, ties to the mass media and to 
business firms dominate. The high proportion of positions in the mass media area 
is partly explained by the fact that the composition of radio and television control 
bodies is determined in large measure by parliamentary bodies as prescribed by 
radio and television statutes. Positions in business organizations held by politi-
Table 13. Multiple Office Holdinga 
Adrnini- BanksI 
stration, Insur- Labor and 
Federall ance Business Employees' 
State Mass Corn- Associa- Agri- Associa- Edu-
Politics Level Media Business panies tions culture tions Science cation Churches 
Federal government/parliament 81.0 2.0 12.0 7.0 1.0 3.0 7.0 4.0 7.0 7.0 8.0 
State governments 64.6 9.8 18.3 26.8 12.2 6.1 1.2 1.2 12.2 11.0 15.9 
Political parties 76.5 1.5 14.7 13.2 7.4 1.5 4.4 7.4 8.8 10.3 
Political civil servants, federal level 9.0 5.1 5.1 19.2 3.8 1.3 1.3 1.3 12.8 5.1 2.6 
Permanent civil servants, federal level 5.1 3.6 4.3 11.6 2.9 2.9 1.4 13.0 1.4 0.7 
Political civil servants, state level 28.3 7.5 11.3 32.1 32.1 1.9 18.9 22.6 7.5 
Pennanent civil servants, state level 9.1 12.4 6.2 13.4 10.0 4.3 2.4 2.4 17.2 17.2 2.9 
-------------------_ .. -------------------------------------------------------------------- ... ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
N Mass media 2.7 0.4 21.4 1.3 0.4 0.4 2.7 3.6 4.9 2.7 
tj Publishers 50.0 2.6 10.5 2.6 5.3 5.3 
Big business 2.9 6.9 2.3 64.7 24.9 41.6 1.2 1.7 26.0 3.5 1.7 
Banks/insurance companies 5.4 2.7 4.1 59.5 54.1 16.2 1.4 1.4 8.1 4.1 4.1 
Business associations 8.9 11.9 4.0 27.7 10.9 52.5 1.0 3.0 11.9 2.0 5.9 
Small business associations 15.0 15.0 20.0 15.0 20.0 20.0 5.0 30.0 10.0 
Agricultura\ associations 22.6 9.4 11.3 22.6 32.1 9.4 66.0 1.9 9.4 11.3 5.7 
Trade unions 27.4 24.2 9.7 37.1 21.0 1.6 53.2 17.7 16.1 4.8 
Science/higher education 10.9 2.2 8.7 6.5 2.2 4.3 78.3 6.5 2.2 
Military 2.4 2.4 2.4 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------.. ------
Politicians by 
Party: 
SPD 72.0 3.0 13.0 20.0 5.0 3.0 4.0 3.0 7.0 12.0 8.0 
FDP 83.3 4.8 11.9 23.8 14.3 2.4 2.4 11.9 4.8 4.8 
CDU 73.5 6.0 16.9 6.0 4.8 3.6 4.8 2.4 8.4 7.2 16.9 
CSU 75.0 4.2 20.8 12.5 8.3 8.3 12.5 8.3 16.7 
aMultiple responses were counted only for inter-sector positions. not for intra-sector positions. 
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cians and civil servants are usually those in supervisory bodies such as boards of 
directors of public corporations and of those enterprises enjoying the financial 
participation by the federal or state govemments. 
The proportion of those politicians who hold positions in the educational 
system and the churches is relatively high. A breakdown by party affiliation 
reveals that the SPD and FDP leadership groups are concentrated, in terms of 
offices and functions, in business enterprises , and those of the CDU / CSU in the 
mass media and religious organizations. The comparatively high proportion of 
SPD politicians in business enterprises may be attributed to three factors: the 
already mentioned assumption of control functions in public enterprises; the 
acquisition of positions in union enterprises acquired by elose ties with trade 
unions; and the acquisition of positions in plants to which the parity codetermina-
tion (equal representation of capital and labor on the board of directors) applies. 
Dominant among the positions that top civil servants occupY outside of gov-
emment are those in business enterprises and in the science sector , but also 
relatively high is the proportion having positions in banks and insurance com-
panies and in the educational system. 
In comparison to the politicians and civil servants who are active in the private 
sector, the number of leaders in the private sector with interlocking positions in 
tbe political-administrative system is low. This is surprising, since the political 
area and, even more, the ministerial administration on both federal and state 
levels offer numerous positions on advisory councils, committees, work groups, 
commissions, and similar bodies. Only the trade union elite makes use of this 
communications potential to a great extent. The sector interlock among the 
noneconomic private sectors must also be described as relatively low: one-half of 
tbe listed additional functions in these sectors are held by the political-admin-
istrative leadership groups, and a further 19 percent go to the neighboring sectors 
of big corporations, business associations, and banks and insurance companies. 
Consequently, one can speak of a genuine sector interlock in only about 31 
percent of these positions. 
The military and mass media are the sectors with the fewest interlocking 
positions. The academic groups, too, have relatively few positions in other 
sectors; however, tbis sector offers the largest number of positions to the other 
leadership groups. For the representatives of big corporations and business asso-
ciations this is the only noneconomic sector with which they have a significant 
connection. The broadest spectrum of sector interlock of its leadership groups is 
displayed by the sectors in which other groups have few or no additional func-
tions: agriculture and the trade unions. The relatively high proportion of union 
elite members in business enterprises can be explained, on the one hand, by 
codetermination and, on the other, by the extensive enterprises of the trade 
unions, especially the German Trade Union Federation (DGB).l1 The interlock-
ing positions of the agricultural elite reflect the elose connection between agri-
cultural associations and production and banking cooperatives. 
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In summary, the political-administrative sectors stand at the center of the 
interactional system analyzed here, but the political leadership groups have 
broader intersector connections than the administrative leaders. 
Direct Comrnunication 
The previous analysis leads to the expectation of a high rate of contacts 
between sectors. Data on direct communication confirm this: almost 98 percent 
of the elite respondents claimed to maintain contacts with institutions and organi-
zations outside their own sector. A sector classification of organizations (Table 
14) underiines the dominant position of the political-administrative sectors in the 
communication and decision-making processes. Except for the banks and insur-
ance companies, the proportion of all private groups reporting contacts with the 
political-administrative area is at least as high as the rate of reported contacts 
within their own sector. The communication of nonpolitical groups with each 
other shows a high rate of exchange with the mass media, confirming the latter's 
central information transmission function. Also in the center of the interaction 
process are big corporations and banks, business associations, trade unions, and 
the churches. 
The interactions within the political-administrative area, as weIl as between 
this area and other sectors, must be seen against the background of political 
structures which facilitate communications. First to be considered among the 
latter is the intemal differentiation of the political-administrative sectors. 
When the organization of the federal executive and West German political 
infrastructure is considered, we can identify some ministries with the interests of 
particular social groups. This identity of interest is shown, for example, in the 
fact that compromises are often negotiated not between competing groups and 
the govemment but between the specialized ministries (see Kaiser, 1956). 
Among the interest representations of this kind are the connections between the 
German Farmers' Association and the Ministry of Agriculture, between the trade 
unions and the Labor and Social Affairs Ministry, and also between big business 
and business associations and the Ministry of Economics. This institutionaliza-
tion of societal interests in the political-administrative sectors can be achieved by 
exerting influence on the selection of the political-administrative leadership per-
sonnel. There, where a ministry can be viewed as a "clientele" ministry (Ver-
bandsinsel), the personnel-political anchorage of group interests is greatest (von 
Beyme, 1969). This applies both to appointments to civil service positions and to 
the respective ministerial positions. Since the founding of the Federal Republic 
only trade union members have been appointed as Labor Ministers and, with a 
single exception (H. Höcherl), all Ministers of Food, Agriculture, and Forestry 
have been members of agricultural associations, mainly of the German Farmers' 
Association. 
The regulations of the right of consultation in ministries has also developed 
Table 14. Direct Communicationa 
Political- lndustrial 
Administrative Mass Corporations/ Business Trade Education/ Social 
System Media Banks Associations Agriculture Unions Science Churches Sector 
Federal governmentlparliament 100.0 89.0 35.0 53.0 11.0 68.0 4.0 70.0 21.0 
State governments 100.0 92.7 56.1 67.1 12.2 82.9 9.8 67.1 14.6 
Political parties 100.0 91.2 48.5 57.4 13.2 75.0 11.8 64.7 14.7 
Political civil servants, federal level 98.7 65.4 41.0 66.7 5.1 66.7 10.3 43.6 11.5 
Pennanent civil servants, federal level 100.0 50.0 40.6 57.2 5.1 63.0 15.2 24.6 8.7 
Political civil servants, state level 100.0 79.2 54.7 71.7 11.3 83.0 13.2 52.8 9.4 
Pennanent civil servants, state level 100.0 67.5 46.9 52.2 10.5 60.8 15.8 38.3 15.8 
--------------------------.--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------._-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
N 
Mass media 95.5 91.1 42.4 61.6 4.9 72.8 6.7 50.4 7.1 
~ Publishers 94.7 86.8 60.5 84.2 63.2 36.8 2.6 
Big business 91.9 60.1 89.6 90.8 1.7 56.1 17.3 23.1 3.5 
Banks/insurance companies 85.1 60.8 89.2 82.4 1.4 43.2 4.1 29.7 1.4 
Business associations 100.0 62.4 78.2 99.0 4.0 68.3 10.9 23.8 2.0 
Small business associations 100.0 85.0 65.0 100.0 5.0 70.0 10.0 30.0 
Agricultural associations 98.1 86.8 83.0 73.6 81.1 69.8 15.1 52.8 1.9 
Trade unions 98.4 87.1 59.7 75.8 6.5 98.4 8.1 45.2 8.1 
Science/higher education 97.8 87.0 41.3 41.3 37.0 69.6 26.1 4.3 
Military 97.6 85.4 19.5 53.7 4.9 51.2 14.6 70.7 4.9 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------._---------------
Politicians by party: 
SPD 100.0 92.0 45.0 49.0 7.0 90.0 10.0 62.0 17.0 
FDP 100.0 90.5 50.0 66.7 14.3 69.0 9.5 54.8 11.9 
CDU 100.0 88.0 39.8 57.8 13.3 60.2 6.0 78.3 19.3 
CSU 100.0 95.8 58.3 87.5 25.0 75.0 4.2 79.2 20.8 
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into an effective means by which private groups exert political influence. In the 
drafting and execution stages (statutory and administrative regulations) of a law 
"the representation of affected associations can be infonned and they may be 
requested to submit materials as weIl as be given an opportunity to state their 
position" (Rufes 0/ Procedures 0/ Federaf Ministries). This regulation is re-
stricted to "top" associations-Le., to associations which are active throughout 
the Federal Republic. In practice, this "can" rule has developed into a process 
of continual consultation between government ministries and private organiza-
tions. This applies especiaIly to the "cIientele" ministries for which joint con-
sultation with corresponding social organizations, and thereby the participation 
of the latter in the legislative process, is a matter of course. Communication and 
compromise is substantiaIly facilitated by the fact that, as a rule, these negotia-
tions between ministries and interest groups are confidential (Hennis, 1961). 
The differentiation within the administrative system is reflected in the spe-
cialized committees of the Bundestag and the Bundesrat, as weil as correspond-
ing bodies of the parties and parliamentary parties. The exertion of the influence 
of private organizations on the selection of parliamentary leadership personnel 
can take place through influencing the nomination of candidates for Bundestag 
elections. This can be done in two ways: either a group demands the nomination 
and election of their own members or they support nonmember candidates and 
thus bind them to their interests (see Hensel, 1973). The influence of private 
groups is, first, financial and, second, through the expectation of the parties of a 
"drawing effect" on the interest group cIientele of such candidates. The most 
favored groups are agriculture, business, and the trade unions. This penetration 
of all parliamentary parties with representatives of powerful groups in connection 
with the internal specialized differentiation of the parliamentary parties and the 
Bundestag favors communication, but also the assertion of group interests: for, 
in the first place, the experts are concentrated in the respective bodies and, in the 
seeond place, the parliamentary party caucuses usually follow the recommenda-
tions of their working groups and the plenary session of the Bundestag follows 
those of its committees. The interparty cooperation of the representatives of 
private groups is also favored, in that they are interested above aIl in the details 
of legislation and here an agreement across party lines is more easily achieved. 
Onee again, this is facilitated by the general confidentiality of the working 
groups and committee meetings (see Neumann, 1979). The strong degree of 
interest group "infiltration" of certain Bundestag committees and parliamentary 
party working groups has as a consequence the fact that, in drafting legislation, 
the ministerial bureaucracy consults the respective committees and working 
groups as weil as the private groups to ensure that these bills can later pass the 
parliamentary legislative process. 
The following remarks must be seen against the background of this rough 
sketch of the political structures as expressed by constitutional practice. In the 
center of the communicative relations of the political-administrative leadership 
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groups are the mass media, industrial enterprises and banks, business associa-
tions, trade unions, and the churches (see Table 14). In comparison with the 
previous findings on sector interlock, the low rate of communication with sci-
ence and education is conspicuous. This is surprising in the case of state politi-
cians and civil servants in view of the "cultural sovereignty" of the states in the 
West German federal system. 
As a consequence of the increasing extension of govemmental activities in 
modem industrial societies, a high degree of communication with the political-
administrative system is to be expected. This is confirmed by our data: the 
average number of institutions of the political-administrative system with which 
the private sectors maintain contacts is 3.3. 12 The breakdown by sector is as 
folIows: 
Mass media 3.9 
Agricultural associations 3.8 
Trade unions 3.8 
Small business associations 3.7 
Sciencefhigher education 3.4 
Business associations 3.3 
Publishers 3.3 
Military 3.2 
Big business 2.5 
Banksfinsurance companies 2.4 
The average number of contacts of the political-administrative elites with institu-
tions in their own sectors is somewhat higher (4.0), although it should be noted 
that politicians exhibit a higher rate of communication than do top civiI servants: 
State govemments 4.8 
Federal govemmentlparliament 4.6 
Political parties 4.6 
Political civil servants, state level 4.5 
Permanent civil servants, state level 3.8 
Political civil servants, federal level 3.4 
Permanent civil servants, federal level 3.0 
The following cornmunications patterns were found for the individual private 
sectors (Table 15): industrial enterprises assert their interests not only via their 
organized interest-representation but also directIy in the political-adrninistrative 
system. Their main "addressee" is the ministerial bureaucracyon both federal 
and state levels. The business associations, on the other hand, displaya broader 
communications structure; their dominant cornmunications partner is the minis-
terial bureaucracy, but they also rnaintain contacts with the Bundestag, as weil as 
with the political parties, to a considerable extent. Likewise the banking and 
insurance leadership groups have a broader spectrum of cornmunications than do 
IV 
d'l 
Federal govemmentlparliament 
State govemments 
Political parties 
Political civil servants, federal level 
Permanent civil servants, federallevel 
Political civil servants, state level 
Permanent civil servants, state level 
Table 15. Contacts with the Political-Administrative Systema 
Federal 
Federal Legislature State 
Administration (Bundestag) Administration 
98.0 99.0 89.0 
95.1 95.1 100.0 
85.3 98.5 89.7 
98.7 94.9 80.8 
100.0 95.7 73.9 
92.5 71.7 100.0 
92.3 36.4 99.5 
State Political 
Legislatures Parties 
73.0 98.0 
97.6 96.3 
88.2 100.0 
7.7 57.7 
1.4 31.9 
100.0 90.6 
95.2 55.0 
... -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------.. -------------------------------------------------------_ .. --
Mass media 83.9 77.2 83.5 56.7 87.1 
Publishers 65.8 65.8 78.9 42.1 78.9 
Big business 77.5 37.6 79.2 19.7 39.3 
Banks/insurance companies 58.1 47.3 60.8 18.9 51.4 
Business associations 97.0 76.2 78.2 20.8 62.4 
Small business associations 95.0 100.0 80.0 25.0 65.0 
Agricultural associations 73.6 64.2 94.3 77.4 69.8 
Trade unions 96.8 87.1 58.1 32.3 90.3 
Science/higher education 69.6 45.7 95.7 73.9 52.2 
Military 95.1 61.0 68.3 36.6 63.4 
"Multiple responses within each of the five units were not counted in this table. 
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the industrial enterprises, and a similar pattern was found for the small business 
associations. The trade unions communicate to about the same extent with the 
federal ministerial bureaucracy, the political parties, and the Bundestag. The 
contacts of the scientific and higher educational groups are predominantly with 
state political institutions, which is due to the cultural federalism in West Ger-
many. Among the agricultural elite the same pattern is explained by the fact that 
the federal structure of German agricultural organizations was taken into account 
in the sampling procedure. 
The very high rate of communications of politicians with institutions of the 
political-administrative system results largely from the fact that most of the top 
political leaders in the Federal Republic hold positions on several levels-in 
parliament, in the government (executive), and in the political parties. Since the 
party and the parliamentary party have different functions-i.e., the party deter-
mines the framework of political action, whereas the parliamentary party is 
responsible for the political implementation of this framework-a practical inte-
gration of these two functions is more easily accomplished by the interlocking of 
the political personnel (see Kaack, 1971). The relatively low rate of communica-
tions of top civil servants with the political parties (in some respects lower than 
that of the private groups) is also explained by the different roles of party and 
parliamentary party. 
The differences found in the previous analysis of political attitudes carry over 
only to a sma)) extent to the communication structure: the members of industrial, 
banking and insurance firms, business associations, and agricultural associations 
communicate to a slightly higher degree with the CDU/CSU, and the trade 
unions with the SPD (not shown). However, a)) nongovemmental groups, with 
the exception ofthe business associations, interact less with the FDP than they do 
with the SPD and CDU /CSU. These results confirm the assumptions of pluralist 
theory-namely, that the private sectors work with all politically relevant parties 
and that a one-sided influence is avoided by these "cross-pressures." However, 
these findings also underline the determination of the pattern of interactions by 
the political structure: the federal structure of a country such as West Germany 
requires cooperation with several parties, since some state governments may be 
governed by other parties than those which form the federal government. 
This analysis of communication patterns has shown that the political-admin-
istrative system stands at the center of the conflict-regulation and consensus-
formation process in the Federal Republic. The integrational capability of this 
sector has al ready been indicated by the above analysis of social and professional 
recruitment patterns. The general acceptance of the central political institutions 
means that this integrative function can also be put into practice. The potentials 
for conflict that existed in the Federal Republic at the time of this elite survey 
were expressed by the political parties, though to differing degrees, and were 
transmitted to the political-administrative system by the political parties. In 
connection with the broad recognition of the pluralist rules of the game and the 
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density of interactions, this guarantees the functional capability and efficacy of 
the system. However, the question may be raised, in view ofthe communication 
patterns and interaction potentials which the system makes available to the elites 
for societal conflict regulation, as to whether the pluralist theory applies here or 
whether the situation in the Federal Republic of Germany does not more closely 
correspond to the neocorporatist model. 
NOTES 
1. For basic descriptions of the West German system of govemment see Ellwein (1978), Pilz 
(1977), Heidenheimer (1961), and Sontheimer (1972). 
2. This study was conducted under the direction of Professors Wemer Kaltefleiter and Rudolf 
Wildenmann by staff members of the Social Science Research Institute of the Konrad Adenauer 
Foundation. For a detailed description of the data base, see Ursula Hoffmann-Lange, Helga Neu· 
mann, Helmut Palme, and Bärbei Steinkernper, Westdeutsche Führungsschicht: Eine sozialwissen· 
schaftliche Untersuchung der Inhaber von Führungspositionen, volume of tables, edited by Wemer 
Kaltefleiter and Rudolf Wildenmann (Kiel and Mannheim, 1973). For reports on this study, see 
Palme (1974), Steinkernper (1974), Kaltefleiter (1976), Hoffmann-Lange (1977), and Neumann 
(1979). 
3. According to the West German constitution, most govemmental activities are carried out by 
state and local agencies. Oue to the development of the welfare state, the proportion of governmental 
services has steadily increased. Today, the proportion of federal laws (over one-half) which require 
approval by the Bundesrat, the second chamber, representing the state administrations, is correspon-
dingly high. Until 1969 this was not problematical, since the same parties had majorities in both 
houses of parliament. Since then, the Bundesrat has been used frequently by its COU/CSU majority 
as an instrument of opposition to the governing SPO/FOP coalition. 
4. The totals add up to only 249, since one member of the state executive elite was an 
independent. 
5. Considered as representatives ofbusiness interests, and hence the business sector, are the elite 
respondents from big corporations, business associations, banks and insurance companies, profes-
sional associations, and agricultural associations. On most questions they have very similar political 
beliefs and are therefore as a role combined into one group. 
6. Bärbei Steinkemper's (1974) analysis of party membership and career patterns of the admin-
istrative elite shows that party members have greater career opportunitites than do nonmembers. She 
found differences among the four different groups of top civil servants which are explained by the 
different positional definitions (political and nonpolitical) and the varying party majority situations on 
the federal and state levels. 
7. This may be due in part to the way the items were formulated. Often the statements were 
formulated as alternatives for which a priority between two values (namely, between democratic 
control or the pluralist power game and freedom of action by the government) was to be indicated. 
This latter aspect of freedom of governmental action was particularly salient, however, at the time of 
the elite survey because of the stalemate between the governrnent and the opposition in the Bundestag 
at that time. 
8. For a detailed presentation of the results for all issues, see Hoffmann-Lange, op. cit., pp. 
looff. For the interpretation, mean differences in scale values up to 0.5 points were considered as 
indicating the same positions; differences between 0.5 and 1.0 as small (negligible) differences; 
between 1.0 and 1.5 as moderate (cIear) differences; between 1.5 and 2.0 as large differences; and 
more than 2.0 points differences in mean scale values as very large attitudinal differences. 
9. In the following analysis, when party preference is taken as an "independent" variable, this 
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should not be understood as meaning that this variable moulds the elite respondents' political beliefs; 
the reversed causal relationship is also plausible-namely, that specific political heliefs lead one to a 
preference for a particular political party. 
10. This effect was also found for the foreign and social issue areas; however, it was clearly 
much less characteristic of the SPD supporters. 
11. The German Trade Union Federation (DGB) owns the following enterprises: Unter-
nehmensgruppe "Neue Heimat" Städtebau-und Wohnungsgesellschaften, which has about 60 sub-
sidiary companies and is the largest European housing construction company; the Bank für Gemein-
wirtschaft AG, wh ich has about 100 subsidiary companies and is the fourth largest supraregional 
commercial bank in the Federal Republic; the Volskfürsorge Lebensversicherung AG, which has 15 
subsidiary companies and is the largest West German life insurance company in terms of policies in 
effect; and the Coop-Zentrale AG, the second largest German retail merchants group. For more on 
this, see Jühe et al. (1977). 
12. Five units were included in this analysis: federal executive, federallegislative, state execu-
tive, state legislative, and political parties. Multiple responses within each unit were not considered 
in the coding. 
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